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Summary:
This paper is an empirical study of land values in Champaign-Urbana.
Land value depends on lot size relative to the typical lot size in the neigh-
borhood. This result supports the notion that minimum lot area zoning can
have externality effects. The supply effects of existing zoning appear to
dominate any externality effects which might exist. This suggests that the
zoning in Champaign-Urbana does more harm than good. Several location
variables are introduced to deal with the fact that the value of land would
vary across land use zones in the absence of governmental zoning.

NEIGHBORHOOD, ZONING, AND THE VALUE OF URBAN LAND
I. INTRODUCTION
Various models have been used to explain urban land values. These
models have exhibited differences in functional forms, levels of aggre-
gation, and the explanatory variables selected. Most often linear func-
tions and aggregate data are employed. In those few studies where dis-
aggregation makes neighborhood variables possible, those which relate
specifically to land characteristics are generally primitive and relate
only to topographical features. Finally, the tendency to include only
a single zoning classification or a small range of classifications has
made it impossible to detect the impact of governmental zoning on land
value within the empirical model. In contrast, this paper uses micro
data, a transcendental function, a new neighborhood variable, and vari-
ables to capture the effect of zoning at the two ends of the zoning
hierarchy.
Neighborhood variables have been utilized to explain urban property
values in a number of studies. Some examples are average assessed value
[3]; value of improvements [22]; degree of blight [9]; percent non-white
[3, 25]; median income [1, 4, 22]; crowding index [3]; air pollution
[2, 19]; and developed area [15]. Focusing on the aspect of land that
differentiate neighborhood characteristics, this paper introduces a
new variable—lot area relative to the typical or average neighborhood
lot area.
Zoning has also been used to explain urban property values in a
number of studies [7, 8, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23], In order to make it pos-
sible to detect the impact of governmental zoning on land values, the

-2-
sample in this paper includes all zoning classifications. A principal
hypothesis of this paper is that governmental zoning has its impact
on urban land values primarily through supply rather than externality
effects. This hypothesis implies that governmental zoning is alloca-
tively inefficient.
In addition to the neighborhood and zoning variables, it is impor-
tant to include location variables. The theory of urban land economics
tells us that different land use zones would have different values in
the absence of governmental zoning so the effect of governmental zoning
can only be measured while holding location constant. Location variables
have been used in several studies in various forms. Examples are dis-
tance to CBD [1, 3, 4, 13, 22]; job access potential [3, 22]; distance
to a regional shopping center [25]; and an urban function access index
(uses time-distance) [9]. This paper utilizes five location variables:
distance to a center of economic activity and dummy variables for
cul-de-sac, growth path, corner lot, and busy street.
II. HYPOTHESES
Neighborhood : The primary importance of neighborhood variables
(i.e., technological externalities or intra-neighborhood effects) in
determining urban land values is undeniable. Those who believe that
these effects are trivial have generally not considered the rapid rate
at which the effects fall off with distance, and used definitions of
neighborhood which are too large. Of course, there are substantial
problems involved in measuring the overall ambient quality of a neigh-
borhood or the various components of quality. The obvious solution is
to use dummy variables to characterize neighborhoods. But if dummy
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variables are used to represent neighborhoods and neighborhoods are
small, it is unlikely that a large enough number of sales will be found
to provide sufficient degrees of freedom. Thus, for empirical as well
as theoretical reasons, it is desirable to attempt to measure the abstract
characteristics of neighborhoods. In order to move into this direction,
this paper includes a variable that takes into account the impact of one
neighborhood characteristic, the relationship of the lot's size or area
to the average lot area in the neighborhood. It is hypothesized that
the values of larger lots are pulled down while the values of smaller
lots are raised according to their positions relative to a typical or
average area. At least for residential property, this may be explained
by the feeling of spaciousness that one experiences within neighborhoods
of typically large lot sizes, and an oppressive-cramped feeling in neighor-
hoods with small lot sizes.
(1) SP
±j
- Ica^/A/*
where 1 > £1 > 0, 62 < 0»3i> 1 62
!
SP. . = the selling price of ith lot in the jth neighborhood,
A.. = the area of lot i in neighborhood j,
A. = the average lot size or area in jth neighborhood,
and k = everything else.
Equation (1) could be rewritten so that the arguments of the selling price
function are lot are and average lot area rather than lot area and the
ratio of lot area to average lot area. While this form is mathematically
equivalent, it is not econometrically equivalent. This is because the
ratio has lower colinearity than average lot area has with lot area.
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Figure 1 illustrates equation 1. Since lot 1 in neighborhood 1
is smaller than average (a,, < A-,) as shown in Figure 1, its selling
price would be expected to be more than if it were in a neighborhood
where it happened to be the average (SP, , > SP.. where a.. = A = a...).
Similarly, suppose that lot 2 in neighborhood 1 is larger than average
(a
2
-
> A..) . As in Figure 1, its selling price would be expected to
be less than if it were in a neighborhood where it happened to be the
average (SP2, < SP2 where a = A
z
= a^J. Note that as average
neighborhood area increases from A-^ to A£ the function which relates
intra-neighborhood lot areas with selling price shifts upward. The
selling price-lot area relationship in equation (1) and illustrated in
Figure 1 has the same look as Deusenbery's well-known relative income
hypothesis or Friedman's permanent income hypothesis without the propor-
tionality assumption. Thus, this relationship will be referred to as
the relative land area hypothesis.
Zoning : What is variously known as hierarchical zoning, cumulative
zoning, or progressively inclusive zoning operates by allocating a zone
to a particular land use or any higher use in the governmentally defined
hierarchy. The rationale for hierarchical zoning suggests that it restricts
the flow of negative externalities from lower to higher land uses in the
hierarchy. If this were the only effect of governmental zoning, the value
of the highest uses in the hierarchy would be raised as a result of the
protection provided by the zoning ordinance (i.e., ceteris paribus). That
is, those who desire to use land for residential purposes, usually the
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highest use in the hierarchy, are able to choose from land in any zone,
but would be willing to pay more for land in the protected residential
zone, holding location and other factors constant. Thus the externality
argument, which provides the rationale for the legal application of
police powers to governmental zoning, implies that there should be a
premium paid for residentially zoned land.
On the other hand, governmental zoning may be put to other purposes.
Special interests in and out of government may be able to shape govern-
mental zoning to serve their own ends [11]. A local government may engage
in fiscal zoning in order to directly protect its purse and indirectly
beggar neighboring governments. Planners may have their biases. "The
almost universal preference, as expressed in zoning statutes, for single-
family dwellings probably inspires planners to ... overallocate land
for single-family use." [14] • If planners are ideologically at odds
with the expansion of business activity locally, they will have little
trouble finding political allies. "The owners of land currently zoned
for (commercial and industrial) use prefer to limit its supply. They
may be joined in their efforts to restrict supply by owners of resi-
dential land who fear the effects of negative externalities" [14]
.
Thus, zoning may not only increase efficiency by separating incom-
patible land uses and reducing the flow of negative externalities. It
may also create inefficiency by distorting the supply of land to the var-
ious uses. The nature of hierarchical zoning causes such distortions to
be asymmetric. It can only overallocate land to the highest uses and
underallocate land to the lowest uses. The reverse of underallocating
land to the highest and overallocating land to the lowest uses is
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impossible. Thus where there are supply effects from governmental zoning,
there would be a tendency for residential land values to be depressed and
commercial land values to be raised by the zoning. Recall that the exter-
nality argument suggests that there would be a premium paid for residential
land. Thus, any net effect of residential zoning on land value indicates
whether zoning operates primarily to improve the allocation of land or
to misallocate land. If the partial effect of commercial zoning is to
increase land value, this would be evidence of the misallocation at the
low end of the zoning hierarchy.
Location ; Five location variables are employed in this study.
The first of these variables is distance to the center of activity. For
Champaign-Urbana, a typical campus town and the subject of this study,
the north end of the University of Illinois 'quad' is the center of ac-
tivity. The university serves as the principal regional employer, the
main night-life rendezvous, and campus town at the north end of the quad
serves some commercial functions. The downtowns (CBDs) for Champaign
and Urbana are not explicitly used as proxies for the centers of activity
because of their relative decline in importance in recent years along
with the development of peripheral shopping centers. However, it should
be noted that the north end of the 'quad' is approximately on a line
halfway between the two CBDs and thus may act as the centroid of the
activity which remains.
The second location variable measures the impact that cul-de-sac
location has on land value. The inclusion of this variable is based on
our belief that the cul-de-sac plays 3 main roles. First, it lends it-
self to flexibility in arrangement and orientation of houses and, thus,
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provides for more variety in spatial arrangements. Second, the cul-de-sac
reduces pedestrian, bicycle, and automobile traffic and, thus, reduces
noise and dirt and increases security. Finally, neighbors around a cul-
de-sac may be more socially integrated than those on traditional grid-
iron patterns, because the cul-de-sac neighborhood is well defined and
small. These factors promote club formation and cohesion as well as
the resulting public goods production (e.g., manicured lawns, freshly
painted facades, and help when needed). Based on such attributes, being
on a cul-de-sac should have a positive impact on selling price.
The third location variable is intended to pick up the impact of
being in the path of rapid growth. Most developments south of Kirby/
Florida Avenue appear to be post 1960, and most post 1960 developments
appear to be south of Kirby/Florida Avenue. Thus the growth path var-
iable is a dummy indicating whether the lot is north or south of this
street.
The fourth location variable is included to capture the effect of
corner location on land value. It is expected that corner location
increases land value. This is especially so for commercial properties.
Corner location enhances the visibility of the property. It provides
more access and more exposure due to the double frontage. Corner loca-
tion provides desireable separation for residential property. Thus,
corner location is probably preferred for both residential and commercial
land users. The corner location variable used in this study is a dummy
indicating whether the lot is a corner lot or not.
The fifth and final location variable is a dummy for high traffic
volume streets. It is hypothesized that location on a busy street has

a positive impact on land value. Commercial activity favors location
on busy streets because of the visibility and high potential for attract-
ing customers because of the sheer numbers who pass by the property.
Time of Sale ; It is hypothesized that during the sample period,
1977 and 1978, land appreciated in value at a rate which was relatively
constant and that the sale price of lot i depends on its time of sale
in the following manner.
Slot,
(2) SPi
= he
where Bio = rate of appreciation,
t^ = time of sale of i lot, and
h = everything else.
III. THE MODEL
All the hypotheses developed above were brought together into the
following equation:
(3) SP
i
= B aJUai ./A )
e2
exp[e 3COMMi + Bi+SRES^^ + B 5QUAD ;L
+ B6CdeS
±
+ B 7GRTHi
+ & 8 CORN,. + BgHTP^ + BioMC^
where SP. = selling price of lot i,
a. . = area of lot i in neighborhood j in thousands of square
2 feet,
A.: = average area in the jth neighborhood (i.e., block) in
thousands of square feet,
COMM. = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is located in a
commercial zone and for all other zones,
SRES. = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is in a single-
family residential zone and for all other zones,
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QUAD. = distance in miles of lot i from the north end of the
University of Illinois 'quad'
CdeS. = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is on a cul-de-sac
and if it is not located on a cul-de-sac,
GRTH = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is located in
the growth path—south of Kirby/Florida Avenue and if
it is located north of it,
CORN. = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is a corner lot
and if it is not.
KTRF. = a dummy variable assigning 1 if lot i is located on a
street with an average-daily traffic volume of 5000 or
more and for less than 5000.
MOS. = the month cf sale of lot i.
i
The sample data consist of all recorded sales in the cities of Champaign
and Urbana during the years 1977 and 1978. The Sale Price data was taken
from transfer tax and deed records while the lot size data was taken from
platbooks . Zoning information for the city of Urbana was taken from the
Champaign County Regional Planning Commission while that of Champaign
was taken from the Champaign City (Planning) Office.
The model was estimated by taking natural logarithms of both sides
of equation (3) and utilizing Ordinary Least Squares. The results of
the estimation are as follows:
(4) In SP. = 1.934 + 0.416 In a - 0.211 ln(a. ./A ) + 0.405 COMM
1 (5.226) (3.923) J (-1.923) 1J J (1.461)
- 0.702 SRES - 0.150 QUAD. + 0.266 CdeS.
(-3.871) (-1.643) 1 (1.737)
1
+ 0.304 GRTH. + 0.207 CORN. + 0.428 HTRF + 0.013 MOS.
(1.866) 1 (1.391) X (1.535) (1.087)
1
(t ratios in parentheses; d.f. = 114)
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The adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.35. (A correlation
matrix for the explanatory variables is shown in Table 1.) The coeffi-
cients on the In a.., In a. ./A., SRES
.
, CdeS
.
, GRTH., are significantly
ij ij J i i i
different from zero at the 90% level of confidence. The coefficient on
the QUAD, variable is significantly negative (one-tail) at the 90% level
of confidence. The coefficients on the COMM , CORN and HTRF dummy var-
iables are significantly positive (one-tail) at the 90% level of confi-
dence.
The magnitude of the annual rate of appreciation is 15.6% this is
the same rate estimated by Colwell and Sirmans [5] for the period 1969-
1975. However the coefficient here does not differ significantly from
zero, whereas it does in the Colwell and Sirmans paper. The main reason
for this remarkable difference is that as the urban bid-rent function
shifts upward over time, the price of peripheral land in transition
from agricultural to urban uses is determined by the agricultural
land price and not by the height of the bid-rent curve. Most sales
in the 1977-78 period were peripheral. Thus the coefficient on the month
of sale variable is more indicative of the experience of agricultural
land prices than urban land prices. There is independent evidence which
suggests that agricultural land prices were relatively stable over the
study period while they increased dramatically over the earlier period.
The relative lot area hypothesis was borne out by the estimation.
Figure 2 shows the estimated relations between value and area relative
to average neighborhood area over the range of 250-18,000 square feet.
In constructing Figure 2, it is assumed that the lot is north of Kirby,
1 mile from the 'quad,' zoned for single-family residential, not located
on a cul-de-sac, not on a corner lot, not located on a busy street, and
sold just at the end of 1978.
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As shown in Figure 2, 3 plots were made: one shows the relation-
ship between value and lot area given that lot area just equals average
neighborhood lot area. The other 2 plots assumed that average neighbor-
hood lot equals 6000 square feet and 12,000 square feet, respectively.
The results as shown in Figure 2 are consistent with the hypothesis as
presented in Figure 1. Land values of larger lots are pulled down while
values of smaller lots are raised according to their positions relative
to a typical or average area in the neighborhood. Note that as the aver-
age increased from 6000 to 12,000 square feet, the function, which re-
lated intra-neighborhood lot areas with selling price, shifted upward.
The coefficient on a^. is significantly greater than and less than 1
at the 99% level of confidence, while the coefficient on (a.. /A.) is
significantly negative at the 95% level of confidence. The coefficient
on a., is significantly greater than the absolute value of the coeffi-
cient on (a. ./A.) at the 95% level of confidence.
The estimated coefficients on the zoning variables strongly suggest
that governmental zoning has done more harm than good. The dummy variable
C0MM. (Commercial) proved to have a substantial positive impact on
land values. Commercial zoning adds 50% to value. The dummy variable
SRES. (single-family residential), on the other hand, proved to have a
substantial negative impact on land value. It appears to cause a 51%
decline in value. The commercial dummy variable is significantly
positive at 90% level of confidence while the single-family residential
dummy variable is significantly negative at 99% level of confidence. The
negative impact on land values of single-family residential zoning means
that the supply effect has swamped any externality effects which might
exist.
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An interpretation of these results is that land in Chaiapaign-Urbana
has been overallocated to residential uses and underallocated to
commercial uses.
The location variables all worked as expected. The land value gra-
dient turned out to be .150. The magnitude of the coefficient on the
'cul-de-sac' dummy variable establishes that, all things being equal,
a lot would be expected to gain 30% in value if it were located on a
'cul-de-sac' The GRTH^ (growth path) dummy variable proved to give
positive impacts on land values. Location south of Kirby/Florida Avenue,
the growth path, would be expected to lead to a 36% gain over values than
north of it. The CORN, (corner lot) dummy variable establishes that, all
things being equal, a lot would be expected to gain 23% in value if it
were located on a corner. The HTRF. (high traffic) dummy variable proved
that location on a busy street would be expected to lead to a 53% gain
in value over other locations.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has offered some empirical evidence of the hypothesized
relationship between urban land values and neighborhood, zoning, loca-
tion and time.
The model in this paper specifies that selling price of urban land
is a function of both lot area and lot area relative to typical neigh-
borhood area. This relative lot-area hypothesis is at least visually
akin to Deusenbery's relative income hypothesis. The relative lot-area
hypothesis provides empirical support for minimum lot-area zoning as an
externality type of zoning. The empirical development of this concept
is probably one of the most important contributions of this paper.
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Zoning appears to do more harm than good. The coefficient on the
commercial zoning dummy variable is significantly positive while the
coefficient on the single-family residential dummy is significantly
negative. These price effects are indirect evidence of distortions in
the allocation of land caused by governmental zoning. It is suggested
that land is being overallocated to the highest uses to the extent that
any positive impact due to reductions of negative externalities must
be swamped by this supply effect. The opposite side of the coin is
that land is overallocated to the lowest uses.
Our zoning results are inconsistent with the results of Maser, Ricker
and Rosett for Rochester, New York [10] . But their comparisons were only
within residential types and x^ithin commercial and industrial not across
the entire spectrum. So they conclude that zoning did not alter market
allocations whereas we not only find that zoning alters market alloca-
tions but that is does so in a counter-productive way. A problem with
their interpretation is that no effect would have the same look as off-
setting effects. That is, the public good effects of externality type
of zoning may be offset by supply effects.
An alternative rationale for zoning may provide a weak defense of
the supply effects which have been found in this study. If there are
distortions in other markets (e.g., credit) which have differential im-
pacts on demand for various land uses, then supply effects of zoning
might be used to overcome the defects in these other markets. Whether
those who zone have the information, analytical capability, and the
legal authority necessary to do this is another question. Certainly,
the use of the supply effect zoning to overcome the defects in other
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markets is a circuitous approach. One wonders why it would not be
superior to attack the problem directly.
There may be yet another rationale for the supply effects of zoning.
A stated objective of zoners in the study area is to "conserve the tax-
able value of land." [26] Suppose that this is taken to mean that gov-
ernmental zoning ought to produce higher aggregate land values than the
market. This can be achieved via the supply effects of zoning if the
constrained land use has a higher price elasticity of demand for land
[17]. However, this method of increasing aggregate land values is un-
certain in its effects, because the relative demand elasticities are
far from obvious. When this method works, the government is utilizing
the same techniques as a price discriminating monopolist would. Thus,
even when the method successfully increases aggregate land value, it
reduces the efficiency with which land is allocated.
The problem with the commercial zoning variable is that it may be
a proxy for the location factors which attract commercial activity. If
governmental zoning merely follows the market, commercial activity would
be found on higher priced land having the desirable location factors.
But it can never be certain that the right location factors have been
identified and included in the regression. Thus, it is possible to
complain if commercial zoning shows positive effect that the impact of
governmental zoning has not been detected. Rather, commercial is cap-
turing the effect of some omitted locational factors. Therefore, loca-
tion variables must be selected with care. The location factors which
are commonly thought to attract commercial activity ought to be included.
Centrality, location in the path of most urban growth, corner location,
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and location on a busy street were used in this study. Land values
were shown to be a negative exponential function from the University of
Illinois quad. Locations in the path of most urban growth, corner
location, and location on a busy street proved to give positive impacts
on land values. Probably distance from the quad, cul-de-sac, and corner
location, and location on a busy street are important for residential
uses.
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